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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. Martinez1
(decided April 17, 2008)
After his conviction for first-degree rape pursuant to a plea
2agreement, David Martinez appealed, arguing that the "John Doe"
indictment that identified him by his DNA markers violated his con-
stitutional right to notification of the charges against him pursuant to
the United States Constitution3 and the New York Constitution. In
this case of first impression, the Appellate Division, First Department
affirmed the trial court, holding that it is not a violation of the right to
notice when the defendant is identified in an indictment by only his
DNA markers. The court reasoned that although the indictment only
referred to the defendant by his unique DNA markers, it was suffi-
cient because it alleged every element of the charged crimes and that
the defendant committed them.6
On October 31, 1996, a young woman was robbed and sexu-
ally assaulted in a New York City subway station.7 Her assailant
forced her at gunpoint to hand over her money and pull down her
l 855 N.Y.S.2d 522 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2008).
2 Id. at 524.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, states, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall ... be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation ......
4 N.Y. CONST. art. I, §6, states, in pertinent part: "[T]he party accused ... shall be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation ... 
Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
6 Id. at 524.
7 Id. at 523.
1
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pants.8 He fondled her, and after unsuccessfully attempting penetra-
tion, ejaculated in her hand. 9 A semen sample was collected and pre-
served, but the investigation that ensued produced no suspects.10
Three years later, the sample was entered into a multi-
jurisdictional DNA database.'' Although there was no match, a New
York County grand jury indicted "John Doe" as identified by his par-
ticular DNA profile in 2001. 2 Meanwhile, Martinez, who had been
serving time for a drug conviction in New Jersey, returned to New
York in 2004 under a parole violation for a nineteen-year-old robbery
conviction.' 3 His DNA profile was entered into the databank and
produced a match for the 2001 "John Doe" rape and robbery indict-
ment. 14 Martinez was arrested and arraigned, and the indictment was
amended to name Martinez as the accused instead of "John Doe."' 5
In December 2004, Martinez moved to dismiss the indictment
on two theories: 1) that the DNA profile which identified him in the
indictment did not "adequately describe" him thereby depriving him
of his constitutional right to notice, and 2) that he had been deprived
of his constitutional right to a speedy trial because the statute of limi-
tations had expired.' 6 In January 2005, his motion was denied be-
cause the trial court found that although the crime occurred eight
years earlier, the 2001 indictment tolled the statute of limitations;
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
Id. at 523-24.
12 Id. at 524.
13 id.
14 Id.
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however, the trial court did not rule on the issue of notice.'7 Ulti-
mately, Martinez pled guilty and was convicted of first-degree at-
tempted rape.' 8 Martinez appealed, arguing that the indictment was
defective because the identifying DNA markers did not provide suffi-
cient notice since only a trained technician could read them.'
9
On appeal, the appellate division noted that although the de-
fendant waived his right-to-notice claim by pleading guilty, his right
to challenge the indictment could survive a guilty plea if it was de-
termined to be insufficient for either failing to accuse Martinez of the
acts constituting a crime, or failing to allege every element of the
crime charged and that he committed it.z° After deciding that the in-
dictment was properly amended, the court addressed his claims on
the merits.2'
Martinez asserted that the "John Doe" indictment implicated
his constitutional right to notice of the charges against him and hence
his ability to mount a defense.22 An indictment serves as notice when
it: 1) alleges all of the material elements of the crime, and 2) asserts
that the defendant committed them. 3 Whether the indictment against
Martinez properly alleged the material elements of the crimes with
which he was charged was not in dispute.24 Martinez' claim instead




20 Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 524 (citing People v. Konieczny, 2 N.Y.3d 569, 575 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't. 2004)).
21 Id. at 525.
22 Id.; see also People v. Iannone, 384 N.E.2d 656, 660 (N.Y. 1978).
23 Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 525.
24 Id. at 524.
2009] 1285
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the indictment.
Under New York law, Martinez' right to notice, as well as his
right to counsel, did not attach until arraignment.15 Additionally, al-
though Martinez claimed insufficiency on the grounds that only a
trained technician is able to decipher DNA markers, 26 the court ex-
plained that a defendant's subjective capacity to understand the in-
dictment is not required as illustrated by cases where an illiterate de-
fendant's indictment is not insufficient merely because he is unable to
read it.27 The court also noted that New York does not limit the form
of identification in an indictment by requiring that the defendant be
identified by name or in any particular manner, 28 and that an amend-
ment at arraignment substituting the defendant's name does not ren-
der the indictment defective.29 Under Section 200.70(1) of the New
York Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL"), amending an indictment is
proper when "the amendment [does] 'not change the theory or theo-
ries of the prosecution as reflected in the evidence before the grand
jury which filed such indictment, or otherwise tend to prejudice the
defendant on the merits.' ,30 Accordingly, having concluded that the
25 Id. at 525; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.15(1), (2) (McKinney 2008) ("Upon
the defendant's arraignment before a superior court upon an indictment, the court must im-
mediately inform him, or cause him to be informed in its presence, of the charge or charges
against him, and the district attorney must cause him to be furnished with a copy of the in-
dictment.").
26 Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 524.
27 Id. at 526 ("To accept defendant's broadside attack on indictment by DNA would lead
to anomalous results. [D]efendant's ... right to fair notice of the crime of which he is ac-
cused is not dependent on the subjective capacity ... to understand it.").
28 Id. at 525; see generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §200.50 (McKinney 2008) (describing
the form and content of an indictment).
29 Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 525.
30 Id. (quoting Tirado v. Senkowski, 367 F. Supp. 2d 477, 491 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting
that "the amendment conformed to the proof before the grand jury")); see also N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW §200.70 (McKinney 2008).
[Vol. 251286
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indictment identifying Martinez by DNA markers provided proper
notice of identification and was appropriately amended, the court ul-
timately affirmed, holding that the indictment served the traditional
purposes of providing fair notice of the accusations, ensuring that the
crimes charged in the indictment were the ones for which Martinez
was to be tried, and protecting him from double jeopardy.
31
The court addressed the attachment of the right to notice, the
breadth of the statutory limits, the traditional purposes of indict-
ment,32 and the treatment of DNA and "John Doe" indictments under
federal law and in other contexts and jurisdictions.33
Under federal precedent, the right of the accused to be in-
formed of the charges against her under the Sixth Amendment at-
taches when the "government has committed itself to prosecution.,
34
Although various courts have determined this point to occur at differ-
ent stages of the prosecutorial process, there is no definitive point that
has been determined by the Supreme Court that prompts the activa-
tion of the Sixth Amendment right to notice.35 However, regardless
of the point at which a defendant becomes entitled to notice under the
31 Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 525-26.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (also noting that commencement of
criminal prosecution "to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are
applicable," begins when "a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of
organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal
law"); Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875, 880 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that a bench war-
rant underlying a detainer indicated that the government was committed to prosecution);
United States ex rel Hall v. Lane, 804 F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1986) (determining that "five
specific 'adversary judicial criminal procedures'-a formal charge, preliminary hearing, in-
dictment, information, or arraignment-are always starting points"); cf Kladis v. Brezek,
823 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the state is not committed to prosecution
during brief period of custody).
" Hall, 804 F.2d at 82.
2009] 1287
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Sixth Amendment, an exception has been carved out in the case of
DNA indictments that provides for the statute of limitations to begin
running and provisions under Title 18, chapter 20836 to become effec-
tive when the individual is arrested or served with a summons in con-
nection with the charges contained in the indictment.
37
Title 18, Section 3282 of the United States Code states that a
defendant cannot be prosecuted for any non-capital offense "unless
the indictment is found ... within five years next after such offense
shall have been committed., 38 It then specifies that the identity of the
accused may be described by DNA profile: "In any indictment for an
offense under chapter 109A39 for which the identity of the accused is
unknown, it shall be sufficient to describe the accused as an individ-
ual whose name is unknown, but who has a particular DNA pro-
file.",40 Furthermore, under Section 3282, provided that the DNA in-
dictment is returned within five years of the commission of the
offense, it will not be subject to the provisions of chapter 20841 until
"the individual is arrested or served with a summons in connection
with the charges contained in the indictment" 42 essentially tolling the
statute of limitations until the DNA profile has been matched with the
defendant.
The admission of DNA evidence in criminal and civil trials is
36 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3161-3174 (West 2008) (protecting a defendant's right to a speedy trial
by setting time limitations in criminal proceedings).
31 18 U.S.C. § 3282(b)(2) (Supp. V 2006); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(b) (West 2008).
38 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (Supp. V 2006).
39 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241-2248 (Supp. 2008) (describing various levels of sexual abuse
crimes in addition to offenses that end in death, repeat offenders, and restitution).
40 18 U.S.C. § 3282(b)(1) (Supp. V 2006).
41 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161 (West 2008).
42 18 U.S.C. § 3282(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V 2006).
1288 [Vol. 25
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virtually undisputed since the United States Supreme Court's land-
mark decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
43
An amendment to Section 3282, which included a tolling provision
and authorization of "John Doe" indictments, acknowledged the effi-
cacy of DNA evidence and formalized congressional intent to re-
spond to the "[p]rofound injustice ... done to rape victims when de-
layed DNA testing leads to a 'cold hit' after the statute of limitations
has expired" by expanding the use of DNA as an identifier in sexual
crimes.4 The rationale in formalizing the use of DNA indictments
was expounded by Senator Joseph Biden in his Senate introduction of
the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2002: "Ten years ago foren-
sic scientists needed blood the size of a bottle cap, now DNA testing
can be done on a sample the size of a pinhead. The changes in DNA
technology are remarkable, and mark a sea change in how we can
fight crime, particularly sexual assault crimes.,
45
In addition to referencing the federal statute, the Martinez
Court cited Tirado v. Senkowsk 4 6 to support its conclusion that the
amendment to the "John Doe" indictment naming Martinez was
proper. In Tirado, the plaintiff filed a petition for writ of habeas cor-
pus, challenging a second-degree murder conviction on several theo-
ries, one of which was ineffective assistance of counsel.47 Michael
Tirado was convicted of the shooting death of a youth based partially
4' 509 U.S. 579 (1985) (establishing the standard for admission of scientific evidence).
44 148 Cong. Rec. 4331, S. 2513, 10 7th Cong. (2002) (enacted) (introducing the DNA
Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2002).
45 Id.
46 367 F. Supp. 2d 477 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
41 Id. at 479, 490-91.
12892009]
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on eyewitness descriptions identifying him by his race and clothing,
and also on the jailhouse testimony of a fellow gang member serving
time for a separate crime. 48 Tirado's indictment originally named
him as "John Doe" to protect his anonymity, but it was subsequently
amended at the prosecution's request.49 Among the issues raised on
appeal, Tirado argued that he was prejudiced by Brady violations,
prosecutorial misconduct, and the ineffectiveness of his own coun-
sel.50 Tirado faulted his counsel for failing to move for dismissal of
the indictment and consenting to the amendment.5  The court dis-
agreed, noting that the prosecution was entitled to amend the indict-
ment, and that because defense counsel had no colorable basis on
which to object, he was not ineffective for failing to move for dis-
missal.5 2 The court ruled that the prosecution's amendment of the in-
dictment to Tirado's proper name upon its unsealing at arraignment
"conformed to the proof before the grand jury and did not prejudice
the defendant.,
53
In its discussion of New York's treatment of amendments to
indictments, the Martinez Court cited two cases to support its conclu-
sion that the amendment of the indictment was reasonable54 and that
the indictment served its traditional purpose by notifying Martinez of
the crime with which he was charged.5
48 Id. at 479-81.
49 Id. at 491.
'o Id. at 484, 488, 490.
5 Tirado, 367 F. Supp. 2d at 490-9 1.
52 Id. at 491.
51 Id. at 491.
54 Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 525.
" Id. at 525-26.
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In People v. Ganett,56 Sabu Gary was convicted for the crimi-
nal sale of a controlled substance.57 Sabu Gary was indicted under
the name "Sabu Ganett," as a result of erroneous identifying testi-
mony by a witness to whom he sold heroin.58 This was the sole tes-
timony before the grand jury, and neither the grand jury minutes nor
the indictment identified him by any other description.59 On appeal,
Gary argued that the indictment which incorrectly named him as
"Sabu Gannet" was essentially a "blank authorization" for the police
to arrest anyone they chose,60 and that as a result he was deprived of
the right to an indictment by a grand jury on a felony charge.6' Ref-
erencing Section 190.65 of New York Criminal Procedure Law, Gary
asserted that there was not enough evidence before the grand jury to
identify him as the person charged with the crime.62 The issue of his
identity was resolved by the jury at trial and the indictment was sub-
sequently amended to name "Sabu Gary. 63 The Appellate Division,
Fourth Department concluded that Gary was not prejudiced by the
amendment of the indictment to his proper name since the grand jury
clearly intended to indict a specific person and that person was
Gary.64
56 416 N.Y.S.2d 914 (App. Div. 4th Dep't. 1979).
5 Id. at 915.
58 Id. at 917.
59 Gannet, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
60 Id. at 917.
61 Id. at 916.
62 Id. at 915-916; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.65 (McKinney 2008) (stating that
a grand jury may indict when "the evidence before it is legally sufficient to establish that
such person committed such offense").
63 Gannet, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 916 n.2.
64 Id. at 915-19.
2009] 1291
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Additionally, in People v. Iannone,65 the defendant moved to
dismiss his indictment, not because it failed to identify him, but be-
cause it failed to set forth the facts of the crime. 66 Iannone was in-
dicted for the crimes of conspiracy and criminal usury for charging
interest on a loan at a rate of over twenty-five percent per year.67 Al-
though he pled guilty to one count of criminal usury, during sentenc-
ing lannone motioned for the first time to dismiss the indictment for
failure to sufficiently allege the facts constituting the crime.68 The
Court of Appeals described the notice function of the indictment as
charging all of the elements of the crime and that lannone committed
the acts comprising those elements in order to ensure that the defen-
dant is tried for the crimes with which he was indicted, to allow him
to adequately prepare a defense, and to avoid subsequent attempts to
prosecute him for the same crime.69 Iannone argued that the indict-
ment was defective because it used overly broad statutory language to
describe the facts constituting the crime thereby depriving him of
these protections.70 The court concluded that the indictment, while
lacking some detail, charged every element of criminal usury and
presented enough facts so as to provide the defendant with informa-
tion of the charges against him.71
The primary distinction between federal and New York treat-
ment of DNA indictments is that New York has no corollary to Sec-
65 384 N.E.2d 656 (N.Y. 1978).
66 Id. at 659.
67 Id.
68 id.
69 id. at 660.
70 lannone, 384 N.E.2d at 659 n. 1.
71 Id. at 663-64.
1292 [Vol. 25
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tion 3282 of the U.S. Code, codifying the use of "John Doe" DNA
indictments. New York tolls the statute of limitations for five years
when "(i) the defendant was continuously outside [the] state or (ii)
the whereabouts of the defendant were continuously unknown and
continuously unascertainable by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence. 72 This tolling limitation of only five years and the increased
burden on law enforcement of exercising reasonable diligence effec-
tively grants the accused greater protection than Section 3282 of the
U.S. Code which tolls the statute of limitations indefinitely.
A second distinction between federal and New York law con-
cems where in the stages of prosecution the right to notice attaches.
Although this distinction is not particularly germane to the Martinez
case, it is worth noting that when considering DNA indictments in
federal cases, the right to notice attaches when the accused is arrested
or served with a summons, whereas in New York it attaches at ar-
raignment.73 Since arraignment occurs after arrest, the fact that the
right to notice in New York attaches at a later point than arrest, indi-
cates, however slight and non-prejudicial, a greater limitation on a
defendant's rights.
Interestingly, the court in Martinez made short work of the
defendant's trial claim that tolling the statute of limitations in his
"John Doe" DNA indictment deprived him of his right to a speedy
trial guaranteed under both the United States Constitution and the
72 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(4)(a) (McKinney 2008).
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New York Constitution.74 Instead, it succinctly concluded that in this
case "no other constitutional rights were implicated" and that "these
problems [for example, the defense's potential inability to conduct its
own DNA testing on the crime scene sample due to the passage of
time] can be dealt with on a case by case basis. 75 The court pointed
to Section 30.10(4)(a)(ii) of New York Criminal Procedure Law,
which provides a five year period when the "defendant's whereabouts
remain unknown and unascertainable through the exercise of reason-
able diligence, 76 and explained that this legislation represents a bal-
ance between avoiding litigation of stale cases against the policy of
providing law enforcement officers with sufficient time to apprehend
suspected criminals.77 Not surprisingly, this particular aspect of
DNA indictments has been the subject of much scholarly debate.
The Martinez Court acknowledged the national trend of ac-
ceptance of DNA indictments in its discussion of the treatment of
DNA evidence and the use of DNA markers for identification in
other jurisdictions and its implications in constitutional claim con-
texts. 78 The court contemplated Section 3282, state statutes that cod-
ify DNA indictments, prior case law that upheld DNA indictments,
and secondary sources to illustrate the growing acceptance of "John
7, U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.Y. CONST. art. I, §6; see also N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 12
(McKinney 2008).
75 Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 526, 527. The court stated as examples that the rights to in-
dictment by a grand jury and the protection from double jeopardy, and the right of confronta-
tion were not implicated. Id. at 526.
76 Id. at 527 n.1; see People v. Seda, 93 N.Y.2d 307, 311 (1999).
" Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 527 n.1.
78 Id. at 525 (citing generally Scott Akehurst-Moore, Note, An Appropriate Balance?-A
Survey and Critique of State and Federal DNA Indictment and Tolling Statutes, 6 J. HIGH
TECH. L. 213 (2006)).
1294 [Vol. 25
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Doe" DNA indictments and the bases upon which they are challenged
to support its ruling.79 Similar to the federal government, the states
of Arkansas, Delaware, Michigan, and New Hampshire have enacted
legislation permitting DNA indictments. 80  Additionally, Wisconsin
and Massachusetts have both upheld DNA indictments in common-
law decisions.8'
In State v. Dabney,82 the seminal case establishing DNA as an
identifier, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held as a matter of first
impression that the identification of the defendant as "John Doe" with
a specific DNA profile in a complaint and arrest warrant was suffi-
cient to meet the statutory "particularity" and "reasonable certainty"
requirements. 83 In Dabney, a fifteen-year-old girl was sexually as-
saulted. 4 A DNA profile was developed based on semen found in
her saliva, and six years later the defendant was charged with kidnap-
ping and first-degree sexual assault.8 5 The complaint included the
DNA profile in the caption and was later amended substituting the
'9 Id. at 525-26.
80 Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 526. Federal law permits DNA profile indictments and tolls
the 5-year statute of limitations for enumerated offenses until the accused has been arrested.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3282. Arkansas' statute states in relevant part that an indictment containing
genetic information of an unknown person valid, and the statute of limitations for rape
prosecution based on DNA is extended to fifteen years. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-
109(b)(l)(B), (i), (j) (West 2009). In Delaware an indictment for a crime identifying the ac-
cused by a particular DNA profile is sufficient identification. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
3107(a) (2009). Michigan allows DNA indictment and the ten-year statute of limitations
doesn't begin to run until the individual is matched with his DNA. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 767.24(2)(b) (West 2008). New Hampshire permits description of the accused by finger-
print or DNA profile and tolls the statute of limitations for specifically enumerated offenses.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 592-A:7(II) (2008).
sI Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 525-26.
12 663 N.w.2d 366 (Wis. 2003).
13 Id. at 369, 371.
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defendant's name.86 In a comprehensive discussion concerning the
viability and precision of DNA profiles and the intent of Wisconsin's
then newly enacted statute extending the statute of limitations in
DNA cases, the court concluded that use of the DNA profile as iden-
tification of the defendant in the complaint and warrant was proper
because it identified a "particular person."
87
Similarly, in 2004, Massachusetts began indicting "John
Does" described by DNA profiles in rape cases.88 Further, many
states that do not yet have statutory provisions specifically for DNA
indictments, nonetheless do have statutes permitting "John Doe" war-
rants and indictments by allowing descriptors other than an accurate
name to identify the accused. 89 Still others have authorized these
types of indictments and warrants in precedential case law. 90 At least
eight other states have charged or indicted genetic profiles, including
California, Kansas, Illinois, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, North Dakota,
Texas, and Utah. 9'
The Martinez opinion clearly reflects the New York judici-
86 Id. at 369-70.
87 Dabney, 663 N.W.2d at 372.
88 Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 526.
89 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 815 (West 2008) ("A warrant of arrest shall specify the
name of the defendant or, if it is unknown ... the defendant may be designated therein by
any name."); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 277, § 19 (West 2009) ("If the name of an accused
person is unknown ... he may be described by a fictitious name or by any other practicable
description ... ").
90 Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 526 (citing Thomas J. Moyer & Stephen P. Anway, Biotech-
nology and the Bar: A Response to the Growing Divide Between Science and the Legal En-
vironment, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 671, 688 (2007).
91 Id. at 526 (citing Moyer & Anway, supra note 90, at 688, 689 n.95 (2007)); Andrew C.
Bernasconi, Comment, Beyond Fingerprinting: Indicting DNA Threatens Criminal Defen-
dants' Constitutional and Statutory Rights, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 979, 981-82 n. 12 (2001) (list-
ing California, Kansas, Illinois, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Utah, Texas, and
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ary's appreciation of DNA as a criminal justice tool, noting that "a
DNA indictment is an appropriate method to prosecute perpetrators
of some of the most heinous criminal acts" and that "[t]he chance that
a positive DNA match does not belong to the same person may be
less than one in 500 million."92 Other state court decisions have ech-
oed these sentiments. For example, the Court of Appeals of Wiscon-
sin in Dabney concluded that "for purposes of identifying 'a particu-
lar person' as the defendant, a DNA profile is arguably the most
discrete, exclusive means of personal identification possible. 93
Norman Gahn, the prosecutor in Dabney, restated the court's finding
that while it is relatively easy to change things such as a name, ad-
dress or physical appearance, no description can be more reasonably
certain than DNA so identification by genetic code is legally suffi-
cient.94
Despite the distinctions between federal and New York treat-
ment of DNA indictments, both evince a similar intent: a desire to
utilize the extraordinary capabilities of DNA profiling as a criminal
justice tool in order for justice to be served, whether to exonerate or
prosecute, especially in sexually-oriented crimes. In his discussion in
"Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology," President Bush ex-
pressed the belief that "we must do more to realize the full potential
of DNA technology to solve crime and protect the innocent." 95 Leg-
92 Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 526.
9 Dabney, 663 N.W.2d at 372.
94 NORMAN GAHN & SUSAN BIEBER KENNEDY, AM. PROSECUTORS RES. INST., FROM JOHN
DOE TO KNOWN OFFENDER: DNA PROFILE ARREST WARRANTS, SILENT WITNESS (2002),
http://www.ndaa.org/publications/newsleters/silent-witnessvolume_7_number_1_2002.htm
1.
95 The White House, News & Policies, Policies in Focus, Advancing Justice Through
2009] 1297
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islators concur. In her remarks in support of reauthorizing the Debbie
Smith Act of 2004, Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney noted, "DNA
is remarkable evidence. It doesn't forget, it can't be confused, it
can't be intimidated and it doesn't lie. While an eyewitness can eas-
ily get mixed up about height, weight, hair color - DNA never
changes its story., 96 Former Attorney General Janet Reno iterated,
"[t]hrough the use of DNA evidence, prosecutors are often able to
conclusively establish the guilt of a defendant. Moreover, as some of
the commentaries suggest, DNA evidence-like fingerprint evidence
- offers prosecutors important new tools for the identification and
apprehension of some of the most violent perpetrators, particularly in
cases of sexual assault., 97 The U.S. Department of Justice calls DNA
evidence "a powerful tool in the search for truth., 98 Some have even
referred to DNA evidence as " 'the finger of God.' "99 This confi-
dence in DNA evidence is echoed throughout the country in various
jurisdictions including New York. Former New York City Mayor,
Rudolph Guigliani stated that "DNA will prove to be the most effec-
DNA Technology, http:/ www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/justice (last visited Sept. 29, 2008).
96 Cong. Rec. E1483, H.R. 5057, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted).
97 Edward Connors et al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: Case Studies in the
Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial (1996), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/dnaevid.txt (original on file with the authors of this report who
are staff members of the Institute for Law and Justice, Alexandria,Virginia).
98 Kathrine M. Turman, Understanding DNA Evidence: A Guide for Victim Service Pro-
viders, OVC Bulletin (2001), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins/dna 4 2001/NCJ185690.pdf (on file
with author at U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Program, Office for Victims of
Crime).
99 Lindsy A. Elkins, Five Foot Two With Eyes of Blue: Physical Profiling and the Pros-
pect of a Genetics-Based Criminal Justice System, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 269 (2003) (citing Aaron P. Stevens, Note, Arresting Crime: Expanding the Scope of
DNA Databases in America, 79 TEX. L. REv. 921, 922 (2001) (quoting DNA Links Convict
to 21-Year-Old Slaying; Evidence Likened to 'The Finger of God', RECORD (N.J.), Mar. 14,
2000, at A5 (quoting Jeanine Pirro, Westchester District Attorney)).
1298 [Vol. 25
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tive tool our civilization has devised to protect the innocent, convict
the guilty, and even prevent many crimes from occurring."' 00
In New York, legislative response to the widely acknowl-
edged viability of DNA testing has prompted the introduction of two
bills. One bill currently under consideration in the New York State
Assembly "[e]nacts the 'sexual assault forensic act' " which, among
other provisions, would amend the New York Penal Law to eliminate
a statue of limitations for prosecution of specific types of sexual as-
sault cases based on DNA evidence.' 1 The State Assembly's recog-
nition of the value of DNA in sexual assault cases is clearly reflected
in the bill's summary which states, in relevant part: "prompt testing
of rape kits [leads] to DNA evidence [which when] cross-checked
with existing DNA databases ... has [led] to the arrest of serial rap-
ists and the continued incarceration of other sexual predators."',0 2 As-
sembly Bill No. A03687 which was "referred to codes" in January
2008, specifically authorizes DNA "John Doe" indictments.0 3 This
proposed legislation indicates that New York's goal is to enact law
substantially similar to the U.S. Code with regard to DNA indict-
ments in sexual assault crimes.
The extraordinary advances made in DNA research since the
Human Genome project began in 1986 have revolutionized the
criminal justice system in its ability to identify both perpetrators of
10o Rudolph W. Guigliani, DNA Testing Aids the Search for the Truth, 223 N.Y. L.J. 83
(2000).
101 Assem. 5349, 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. Feb. 15, 2007), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn= A05349&sh-t (on file with author).
102 Id.
103 Assem. 3687, 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. Jan. 26, 2007), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn= A03687&sh=t (on file with author).
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crimes and their victims. 0 4 The heartbreaking accounts of perpetra-
tors of sexual abuse, kidnapping or murder of women and children at
long last brought to justice, the discovery of missing children and
other persons, and the identification of remains at the World Trade
Center site demonstrate the humanitarian aspects of the use of DNA
evidence.10 5 Newspapers, periodicals, and books relate stories of how
DNA evidence provided closure for victims and their families or
rather freed the falsely imprisoned. For example, in the infamous
murder case of six-year-old beauty queen JonBenet Ramsey, DNA
testing has finally eliminated her parents as possible suspects. 10 6 The
at-large killer's DNA has been entered into the National DNA Data-
bank with the hope that one day there will be a match, 0 7 putting the
mystery that has fascinated the public for over a decade to rest.
Shortly after Virginia Governor Mark R. Warner approved additional
testing, a Toronto DNA lab confirmed the guilt of Roger Keith
Coleman who, despite vehemently protesting his innocence, was put
to death in 2002 for the brutal rape and murder of his nineteen-year-
old sister-in-law. 0 8 In a case that polarized the country around the
death penalty debate, the DNA tests showed conclusively that Cole-
man was guilty. 10 9 A recent Dallas news story reported that Patrick
104 See Elkins supra note 99, at 271.
105 See Elkins supra note 99, at 283.
106 DNA Backlog May Hamper JonBenet Case: It Could Take Years to Enter Genetic
Samples Already Collected, Associated Press, July 10, 2008)
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25629128/.
107 Id.
108 DNA Tests Confirm Executed Man's Guilt: Va. Man Went to His Death in 1992 Pro-
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Waller, wrongly convicted and imprisoned for fifteen years, was re-
leased in July of this year."1 ° During the hearing that freed him,
"[h]is sobs were the only sound in an otherwise silent court room."11
Despite confessing in front of a grand jury, the man whose guilt was
confirmed by DNA cannot be prosecuted, because the statute of limi-
tations expired. 112 But while these sensational stories generate head-
lines, scholars have made much of the constitutional rights implicated
by use of DNA technology in evidence. 13 Litigation and writings on
the rights to privacy, speedy trial, and other constitutional rights have
proliferated. Although it did not specifically rule on these issues, the
Martinez Court referenced one of these writings in its discussion of
the right to speedy trial. 1 4 Concerning the passage of time between
commission of the offense and prosecution, the court quoted an arti-
cle acknowledging that a DNA prosecution many years after the
crime would result in evidentiary issues that severely limit a defen-
dant's ability to rebut DNA identification. 5 This reference invokes
110 Dallas Man Freed By DNA After 15 Years In Prison, 5HD nbc5i News, Dallas/Ft.
Worth, July 3, 2008, http://www.nbc5i.com/news/16783299/detail.html.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 See Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 115, 128 (2008).
[B]ecause the rule ignores the interests that criminal statutes of limita-
tions are thought to protect, the John Doe indictment exception has
proved quite controversial. Although heralded by the public as "a neces-
sary innovation to prevent criminals from running out the clock under
the statute of limitations," commentators have observed that "DNA in-
dictments disregard the very purpose for which statutes of limitations
were enacted: to provide repose and preclude defendants from being
held to answer stale charges so outdated they presumptively impede de-
fendants' abilities to marshal potential exculpatory evidence."
Id. (citations omitted).
114 Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 527.
115 Id. (quoting Frank B. Ulmer, Using DNA Profiles to Obtain "John Doe" Arrest War-
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the "speedy trial" right's underlying intention to prevent prejudice to
the defendant as a result of stale litigation and his inability to mount a
defense. As a result of tolling provisions, "John Doe" DNA indict-
ments may be abused as an end-run around the protection afforded by
statutes of limitations.' 16
As with many legal issues, it boils down to a balancing of
rights. Certainly, in Martinez, the court appropriately held that none
of Martinez' constitutional rights were violated.1 7  As the court
pointed out, the New York legislature, in imposing a five-year statute
of limitations and a reasonable diligence requirement, conducted a
balancing between the competing interests of bringing criminals to
justice and preventing prejudice through stale litigation."' The
court's reticence in discussing the statute of limitations problems
posed by DNA indictments may reflect the judiciary's reluctance to
trod on the legislature's territory," 9 or, more likely, the court is well
aware of the pending legislation concerning DNA indictments and
simply chose not to include commentary that will be rendered moot
by the imminent enactment of law.
20
Insufficient notice, stale litigation, and other prejudices asso-
ciated with DNA indictments will surely continue to call into ques-
tion the extent of a defendant's rights under both the United States
Constitution and the New York Constitution. However hard these
rants and Indictments, WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1585, 1616 (2001)).
116 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
"7 Martinez, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 526.
118 Id. at 527.
119 John Caher, Watching the Court Evolve, 231 N.Y. L.J. S2 (2004).
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battles are fought, these eloquent words from Governor Pataki in his
plea to eliminate the statute of limitations for rape in New York ar-
ticulate perhaps the strongest response to these types of constitutional
claims:
There is no statute of limitations on anguish. There is
no statute of limitations on pain . . . . Heinous and
violent crimes, such as rape, leave the survivors with
severe and long-lasting physical and emotional scars.
Because the trauma suffered by victims can often last
a lifetime, there should be no arbitrary time limit on
seeking justice.12'
Jean K. Delisle
121 James Herbie DiFonzo, In Praise of Statutes of Limitations in Sex Offense Cases, 41
Hous. L. REv. 1205, 1225-26 (2004) (citation omitted).
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EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
United States Constitution Amendment VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to...
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
New York Constitution article I, section 6:
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed
to appear and defend in person and with counsel as in civil actions..
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